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Abstract
Except for the famous Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (DFS) models, most general equi-
librium models of trade rely on factor price equalization. The DFS models demonstrate
the gains from trade without factor price equalization under perfect competition. This
paper employs a general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition which implies
distortions both at the intensive and extensive margin. If factor prices do not equal-
ize, imperfect competition will not reverse the specialization pattern. However, mutual
gains from trade are not guaranteed, but one country may be worse off by trade.
JEL-Classification: F12, D50.
Keywords: Oligopolistic competition, general equilibrium, international trade, factor
price differences.
1 Introduction
Traditional models of trade discuss mostly the incentives for and the outcomes of
trade between relatively similar countries, an implication of which is that factor prices
across countries are equalized. While this seems to be consistent with the observation
of significantly large intra-industry trade volumes between countries with similar fac-
tor endowments, factor price equalization has found little empirical support. Once the
trading partners are sufficiently different (in terms of size, in terms of factor endow-
ments, or in terms of production technology, etc.), it is a well-established result that
factor prices will no longer be equalized.1 The consequences of trade when factor prices
are different across countries are, however, not well scrutinized in the trade literature.
This paper hence contributes to the literature by delineating the implications of differ-
ent factor prices across countries, originating from factor endowment differences across
countries, on the patterns of and gains from trade, in a multi-industry general equilib-
rium model of oligopolistic competition with free market entry and exit of firms. The
model features two factors of production: capital which is used to establish firms, and
labor which is used for production.
It is mainly the literature on the economics of multinational firms and vertical integra-
tion that focuses on the implications of different factor prices across countries. Helpman
(1984), for example, shows in a general equilibrium framework that when countries are
sufficiently asymmetric in terms of their relative factor endowments, factor prices will
not equalize in equilibrium, which generates incentives for firms to vertically integrate.
Also he finds that the extent of multinationality increases with an increase in the
difference between relative factor endowments of the trading partners. In his model,
the relative factor prices across countries tend to converge, especially with sufficiently
large number of multinational firms: the existence of multinationals puts a downward
(upward) pressure on the wage-rental ratio in the capital-abundant (labor-abundant)
country. Similarly, in a general equilibrium framework, Feenstra and Hanson (1997)
study the labor market consequences of vertical integration between North (the USA)
and South (Mexico). They show that different factor prices across countries lead firms
to vertically integrate, and that capital flows from a capital- (and skilled-labor-) abun-
dant (North) country to an unskilled-labor-abundant (South) country increase demand
1For instance, by introducing differences in country size as measured by labor endowments, the only
factor of production, Krugman (1980) shows that the wage rate is necessarily higher in the larger
country.
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for skills and the average skill intensity in both countries, which can explain the increase
in the skill premium in both the USA and Mexico in the late 1980s.2
In this paper, we do not focus on multinational activities, but on the effects of trade
when factor prices do not equalize across countries. The model we employ can be seen
as an extenstion of the famous Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (DFS) model, Dornbusch
et al. (1980), who demonstrate the gains from trade without factor price equalization
under perfect competition. We depart from the DFS model, and from the standard
approach to imperfect competition and trade (e.g., a general equilibrium model of
monopolistic competition as in Krugman, 1980), by considering a model in which all
commodity markets are imperfectly competitive, and there are economies of scale in
all industries. The modeling approach in this paper is also different from Markusen
(1981), who employs a two-sector model that features one monopoly and one perfectly
competitive industry, and focuses on the implications of trade that originates from
country size differences. He shows that factor prices do not equalize across countries of
different size, and that welfare in a smaller country unambiguously increases, whereas
the welfare implications of trade are ambiguous in a larger country.
Our model setup in this study is similar to Koska and Stähler (2014), building on the
famous Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (DFS) model, but we now accommodate factor
price differences. Koska and Stähler (2014) focus only on trade equilibria with equal
factor prices across countries, while the model here scrutinizes the role of different
factor prices across countries: we look at inter-industry trade between countries that
are sufficiently different in their factor endowments (e.g., North-South or South-North
trade).3 In this setup, domestic and foreign firms cannot coexist in the same industry.
However, oligopolistic competition does not reverse the specialization patterns as they
are well known from classical trade models: the capital-abundant country is a net
exporter of capital services and a net importer of labor services as embodied in trade.
Unless one country specializes in production of a sufficiently small range of goods, the
wage-rental ratio increases in both countries. If the countries are sufficiently asymmetric
in terms of their capital endowments, then a beneficial rationalization effect of free trade
2Feenstra and Hanson (1997) discuss that similar results hold also with an increase in capital endow-
ments of both countries as long as the increase is more in South, or with technological progress in
both countries as long as it is at a faster rate in South.
3Volumes of trade between countries with sufficiently different factor endowments are sginificantly
large. UNCTAD (2013), for instance, reports that North-South and South-North trade comprises,
approximately, 40 per cent of global trade.
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under different factor prices will be materialized unambiguously (via a decrease in the
number of firms) in industries that are hosted by the relatively labor-abundant country,
whereas the trade-induced changes in firm size and/or per-capita consumption are
ambiguous. According to our simulation results, a sufficient increase in the capital stock
of the capital-abundant country - so that the countries become sufficiently asymmetric
in terms of factor endowments - reduces welfare in the capital-abundant country, while
increasing welfare in the labor-abundant country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and discusses the autarky equilibrium. Section 3 scrutinizes the equilibrium with no
factor price equalization (NFPE) and discusses the implications of inter-industry trade.
Section 4 delineates trade-induced changes in per-capita consumption, discusses welfare
implications, and presents simulation results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
For convenience, we have relegated most proofs and technical details to the Appendix
section.
2 The model
We consider two countries: Home (North) and Foreign (South). All variables that are
specific to Foreign are presented with (∗). Each country is endowed with labor (L
or L∗) and capital (K or K∗). Factor endowments are fixed in each country: there
is no factor mobility across countries. In each country, capital is used to establish a
firm, and labor is used for producing output. There is a continuum of goods, indexed
by z ∈ [0, 1]. Households are symmetric and have Cobb-Douglas-type preferences,
represented by the utility function U =
∫ 1
0 ln(yˆ(z))dz where yˆ(z) denotes per-capita
consumption of commodity z. In autarky, the aggregate output of industry z in Home
is Y (z) = Lyˆ(z), and in Foreign is Y ∗(z) = L∗yˆ∗(z), leading to an inverse demand
function p(z) = I/Y (z) in Home, and p∗(z) = I∗/Y ∗(z) in Foreign, where I and I∗
denote, respectively, Home and Foreign income, and p(z) and p∗(z) denote the price
of good z in Home and Foreign, respectively. The profit of firm i in industry z that is
hosted by Home, denoted Πi(z), and by Foreign, denoted Π∗i (z), is respectively, equal
to
Πi(z) = (p(z)− λ(z)w)yi(z)− rκ(z), Π∗i (z) = (p∗(z)− λ(z)w∗)y∗i (z)− r∗κ(z), (1)
where w and w∗ denote, respectively, Home and Foreign labor wages; and r and r∗
denote, respectively, the rental rate in Home and in Foreign. Firm-level outputs are
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denoted by yi(z) in Home, and by y∗i (z) in Foreign. The aggregate output of industry z
is equal to Y (z) = ∑i yi(z) in Home and Y ∗(z) = ∑i y∗i (z) in Foreign. In each country,
all firms within industry z are symmetric: Y (z) = n(z)yi(z) in (Home) equilibrium, and
Y ∗(z) = n∗(z)y∗i (z) in (Foreign) equilibrium, where n(z) and n∗(z) denote, respectively,
the number of active Home and Foreign firms in industry z. For a given industry z, the
labor input requirement, denoted λ(z), is the same in Home and in Foreign. Also, in
each country, firms have to make an investment of size κ(z) > 0 that allows for entry
into industry z. It is the cost of establishing a firm in industry z.
Industries are ranked, without loss of generality, according to the capital input require-
ments, such that z decreases strictly with the capital input requirement κ: κ′(z) < 0.
That said, the model puts no restriction on the behavior of labor input requirements,
nor does it put any restriction on firm entry or on firm output. In particular, the model
considers a two-stage game, in which firms compete by strategic substitutes in the sense
of Bulow et al. (1985). In the first stage, firms decide on their entry into industry z.
In the second stage, they decide on their outputs. This game structure is strategically
equivalent to one in which firms, after having made their market-entry investments,
choose their capacities and hire labor to produce maximum outputs before they will
compete by prices (see, for example, Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). We solve the game
backwards. Firms are risk-neutral and maximize their profits, given by eq. (1), for a
given wage and rental rate, and for a given income level.4 In the autarky equilibrium,
a firm, operating in industry z that is hosted by Home and by Foreign, maximizes its
profit by producing, respectively,
yi(z) =
I
λ(z)w
n(z)− 1
n(z)2 , y
∗
i (z) =
I∗
λ(z)w∗
n∗(z)− 1
n∗(z)2 .
As there is free entry/exit of firms, all firms make zero profits.5 In equilibrium, ignoring
the integer constraint, the zero-profit condition leads to
n(z) =
√
I
rκ(z) , n
∗(z) =
√
I∗
r∗κ(z) .
4Firms compete for resources without considering their influence on factor prices (and thus on national
income). That is, firms can exercise market power only in their respective commodity markets, while
they have no influence on factor markets, because there is a sufficiently large number of industries.
For discussions of this, see Neary (2007; 2009), and Neary and Tharakan (2012).
5Positive profits in an industry would rise capital demand, reducing industry profits due to firm entry
into that industry, whereas negative profits would reduce capital demand, increasing industry profits
due to firms exiting that industry. In response to changes in capital demand, also the rental would
change, but this effect is not taken into account by potential entrants.
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The model focuses on oligopolistically competitive commodity markets, which warrants
n(z) ≥ 2 and n∗(z) ≥ 2. That is,
√
rκ(z)/I ≤ 1/2 and
√
r∗κ(z)/I∗ ≤ 1/2. We shall
note that the market for capital is perfectly competitive, so firm ownership is diversified
and capital owners take r as given. They have no influence on the behavior of firms,
and thus the price normalization problem cannot arise as in Dierker et al. (2003), and
Dierker and Dierker (2006). To ensure that at least two firms will be established in
each industry, we assume, throughout the paper, that each country is endowed with
sufficient capital, such that K > 2κ(0) ≥ 2Ω2 and K∗ > 2κ(0) ≥ 2Ω2, where the
last inequality follows from the ranking of industries. Note that Ω ≡ ∫ 10 √κ(z)dz. This
assumption also guarantees that firm and industry outputs in equilibrium, which are
given (respectively for Home and for Foreign) by eq. (2), are strictly positive:
yi(z) =
rκ(z)
λ(z)w
(√
I
rκ(z) − 1
)
, Y (z) =
√
Irκ(z)
λ(z)w
(√
I
rκ(z) − 1
)
; (2)
y∗i (z) =
r∗κ(z)
λ(z)w∗
(√
I∗
r∗κ(z) − 1
)
, Y ∗(z) =
√
I∗r∗κ(z)
λ(z)w∗
(√
I∗
r∗κ(z) − 1
)
.
By using eq. (2), labor and capital demand of industry z, respectively for Home and
for Foreign, can be expressed as
L(z) = λ(z)Y (z) = I
w
−
√
Irκ(z)
w
, K(z) = κ(z)n(z) =
√
I
r
√
κ(z), (3)
L∗(z) = λ(z)Y ∗(z) = I
∗
w∗
−
√
I∗r∗κ(z)
w∗
, K∗(z) = κ(z)n∗(z) =
√
I∗
r∗
√
κ(z).
Throughout out the paper, the ratio between the establishment and operating inputs,
denoted µ(z) and µ∗(z), is referred to as the capital intensity, which is endogenous in
the model. We can use eq. (3) and show that the capital intensity of industry z, hosted
by Home and by Foreign, are, respectively, given by eq. (4):
µ(z) ≡ K(z)/L(z) =
w
r√
I
rκ(z) − 1
, µ∗(z) ≡ K∗(z)/L∗(z) =
w∗
r∗√
I∗
r∗κ(z) − 1
(4)
Eq. (3) and eq. (4) show that, irrespective of the labor input requirement, more capital-
intensive industries demand more capital (K ′(z) ≤ 0 and K∗′(z) ≤ 0) and less labor
(L′(z) ≥ 0 and L∗′(z) ≥ 0), and that the capital intensity increases with the capital
input requirement (µ′(z) ≤ 0 and µ∗′(z) ≤ 0).
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In equilibrium, all commodity markets and the two factor markets clear, leading to
L =
∫ 1
0
 I
w
−
√
Irκ(z)
w
 dz = I
w
−
√
Ir
w
Ω, K =
√
I
r
Ω,
L∗ =
∫ 1
0
 I∗
w∗
−
√
I∗r∗κ(z)
w∗
 dz = I∗
w∗
−
√
I∗r∗
w∗
Ω, K∗ =
√
I∗
r∗
Ω.
The model is closed by the income definition: I = wL + rK and I∗ = w∗L∗ + r∗K∗.
Without loss of generality, let the rental rate be a numeraire in the model. Using
Walras’ Law and the equilibrium conditions for the factor markets, we can show that
K =
√
wL+KΩ ⇔ w = K
L
(
K
Ω2 − 1
)
, (5)
K∗ =
√
w∗L∗ +K∗Ω ⇔ w∗ = K
∗
L∗
(
K∗
Ω2 − 1
)
We can substitute each country’s autarky wage-rental ratio, given by eq. (5), into the
income definition (I = wL + K and I∗ = w∗L∗ + K∗) and show that each country’s
autarky income increases more than proportionately with its capital stock: I = K2/Ω2
and I∗ = K∗2/Ω2. Moreover, we can show that the autarky wage-rental ratio in the
country that has a larger capital stock (in North) is higher than that in the other
country (in South), even if the two country’s per-capita capital endowments (k ≡ K/L
and k∗ ≡ K∗/L∗) are the same.
3 Factor price differences and international trade
In this section, we allow for trade between Home (North) and Foreign (South). When
the two countries are sufficiently asymmetric in terms of their factor endowments, the
factor prices differ across the countries. Factor price equalization is closely related to
the existence of a cone of diversification: whether or not all goods are produced within a
country. Hence, we look at first the existence of active firms in the two countries where
factor prices are different. Different factor prices imply that firms are not indifferent
where to locate, and on aggregate their location decisions have an impact on equilibrium
factor prices. We find that
Proposition 1 There is no coexistence of domestic and foreign firms in industry z if
factor prices differ.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
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A simple interpretation of Proposition 1 is that factor price equalization is crucial for
diversification. Different factor prices imply different cost structures, and thus different
cost structures imply that one country will not host firms of an industry due to higher
costs, and firms of that industry will be geographically concentrated in the other coun-
try.6 Of course, due to factor market clearance in both countries, this cannot be true
for all industries so that each country will attract some industries.7 In what follows,
we will scrutinize an equilibrium in which factor prices continue to differ after trade
liberalization, and we will look at the welfare implications of inter-industry trade. The
analysis of trade without factor price equalization is usually not on the agenda if an
FPE equilibrium exists. However, we will show in this study that differences in factor
endowments between the trading countries play an important role in mutual welfare
gains.
We know from Proposition 1 that different factor prices imply geographical concentra-
tion of industries. Thus, we are now interested in the possible specialization patterns
for the equilibrium factor prices. Given Proposition 1, an industry will be hosted by
the country having the lowest price for the equilibrium factor prices. Let p(z) and p∗(z)
denote the price if, respectively, the domestic country and the foreign country hosts
industry z. We can replace the income definition for each country with the definition of
world income, Iw = wL+ rK+w∗L∗+ r∗K∗, in the expressions Y (z) and Y ∗(z), given
by eq. (2), and in the price definition, such that p(z) = Iw/Y (z) and p∗(z) = Iw/Y ∗(z),
and we can express the prices as
p(z) = λ(z)wΨ(z) ; Ψ(z) = 1−
√
rκ(z)
Iw
,
p∗(z) = λ(z)w
∗
Ψ∗(z) ; Ψ
∗(z) = 1−
√
r∗κ(z)
Iw
,
if production takes place in Home or in Foreign, respectively. Since all factor markets
have to be cleared, there must be at least one indifferent industry zˆ for which p(zˆ) =
p∗(zˆ). Thus, we find that
λ(zˆ)w
Ψ(zˆ) =
λ(zˆ)w∗
Ψ∗(zˆ) ⇔
w
Ψ(zˆ) =
w∗
Ψ∗(zˆ) . (6)
6Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. 103) discuss that the scale of production may be different across
countries when factor prices do not equalize, and when the production technology is not homothetic
so that firms of different scale may coexist in a free entry trade equilibrium. The specific structure
of the DFS model does not include this case.
7Proposition 1 is not completely new; see for example Helpman and Krugman (1985) for the case of
homothetic production functions.
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The pattern of specialization is then straightforward. Given κ′ < 0 (the behavior of the
capital input requirements across the whole range), we find that
Proposition 2 In an equilibrium in which factor prices continue to differ after trade
liberalization, one country has the higher equilibrium wage and the lower equilibrium
rental compared to the other country. This country hosts industries in the range z ∈
[0, zˆ], and the other country hosts industries in the range z ∈ [zˆ, 1].
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
We can also identify which country is more capital-abundant such that these patterns
may emerge. We have already shown that the capital intensity increases with the capital
input requirement, which is negatively related to z, thus the capital intensity decreases
with z. This will also be true along the range of commodities produced within each
country. Assume that Home (North) produces in the range z ∈ [0, zˆ]; in this case,
µ′(z) < 0 for z ∈ [0, zˆ] and µ∗′(z) < 0 for z ∈ [zˆ, 1]. Using the definition of µ, given by
eq. (4), and the definition of zˆ, given by eq. (6), we find that
µ(zˆ) =
√
r∗
r
µ∗(zˆ) > µ∗(zˆ).
Proposition 2 has shown that North must have a lower rental than South if it produces
in the capital-intensive range, and this is the reason why µ(zˆ) > µ∗(zˆ). Therefore, the
capital intensity in both countries behaves like in Figure 1.
Factor market clearance implies that relative factor demand for capital is a weighted
average of capital intensities. Thus, it follows immediately from the Intermediate Value
Theorem that the weighted average will be higher in the country hosting the capital-
intensive industries, whereas it will be lower in the country hosting the labor-intensive
industries, and this must be matched by the per-capita capital endowment. In our case,
it follows that k > k∗. Additionally, there are clearly lower bounds on the difference
in relative factor endowments. In order to make Figure 1 consistent with the relative
factor endowments, a sufficient (but not yet necessary) requirement is that k ≥ µ(zˆ)
and k∗ ≤ µ∗(zˆ). Therefore we conclude that
Proposition 3 An equilibrium in which factor prices continue to differ after trade
liberalization exists only if the countries are sufficiently different with respect to their
relative capital endowments. If the countries are sufficiently asymmetric in their relative
factor endowments, then the capital-abundant country produces the capital-intensive
commodities in equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Capital intensities in the NFPE case
In the trade equilibrium with different factor prices across countries, we find that
oligopolistic competition cannot reverse the specialization patterns as they are well
known from classic trade models. Furthermore, a direct implication of Proposition 3 is
that the capital-abundant country will be a net exporter of capital services and a net
importer of labor services as embodied in trade.8
If we maintain our assumption that Home (North) produces goods in the range [0, zˆ],
and Foreign (South) produces goods in the range [zˆ, 1] then labor and capital markets
clear in Home and in Foreign if, respectively,
L =
∫ zˆ
0
Iw
w
−
√
Iwrκ(z)
w
 dz; K =
√
Iw
r
∫ zˆ
0
√
κ(z)dz,
L∗ =
∫ 1
zˆ
Iw
w∗
−
√
Iwr∗κ(z)
w∗
 dz; K∗ =
√
Iw
r∗
∫ 1
zˆ
√
κ(z)dz,
where Iw is world income. Rearranging the capital market condition and substituting
it into the labor market condition yields (respectively for Home and for Foreign):
L = I
wzˆ − rK
w
; L∗ = I
w(1− zˆ)− r∗K∗
w∗
.
8See Brecher and Choudhri (1982) for this result in a Heckscher-Ohlin model without factor price
equalization.
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Rearranging these equations yields the trade balance condition, that is, each country’s
income should be equal to its production such that
wL+ rK = Iwzˆ; w∗L∗ + r∗K∗ = Iw(1− zˆ). (7)
So we have three equations, the two equations clearing the capital markets - one for
each country - and the trade balance condition. Furthermore, eq. (6) determines zˆ. In
summary, we have four independent equations, and, after using the domestic rental
rate as a numeraire again, that is, r = 1, four unknowns, w,w∗, r∗ and zˆ, and we can
show:
Proposition 4 If an NFPE equilibrium exists, it is unique.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Using the conditions clearing capital markets, and given the numeraire r = 1, we can
show that, in equilibrium,
Iw = K
2
ζ(zˆ)2 =
(K∗)2r∗
(Ω− ζ(zˆ))2 ; ζ(zˆ) =
∫ zˆ
0
√
κ(z)dz. (8)
We can solve equation (8) for r∗, and show that
r∗ =
(
K
K∗
)2 ( Ω
ζ(zˆ) − 1
)2
. (9)
Using the trade balance condition for each country, given by equation (7), world income,
given by equation (8), and r∗, given by equation (9), and given r = 1, we can derive
the equilibrium wage-rental ratio, respectively, in North and in South:
w = K
L
(
Kzˆ
ζ(zˆ)2 − 1
)
,
w∗
r∗
= K
∗
L∗
(
K∗(1− zˆ)
(Ω− ζ(zˆ))2 − 1
)
. (10)
We can now compare the wage-rental ratio in each country before and after trade
liberalization (given by equations (5) and (10), respectively), and we can show that
when the two countries are sufficiently different in terms of factor endowments - so that
factor prices continue to differ after trade liberalization - trade increases the wage-rental
ratio in both countries if each country hosts a sufficiently large range of industries, such
that
z < zˆ < z ; where z ≡ ζ(zˆ)
2
Ω2 < z ≡
ζ(zˆ)
Ω
(
2− ζ(zˆ)Ω
)
< 1.
If the range of industries located in North, [0, zˆ], is significantly small, such that zˆ < z
– if North specializes too much in a few substantially capital-intensive industries –
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then the wage-rental ratio decreases in North, whereas South experiences an increase
in the wage-rental ratio. Similarly, if the range of industries located in South, [zˆ, 1], is
significantly small, such that zˆ > z – if South specializes too much in a few substantially
labor-intensive industries – then the wage-rental ratio in South decreases, whereas
North experiences an increase in the wage-rental ratio. It is clear that the wage-rental
ratio cannot decrease in both countries: there will be an increase in the wage-rental
ratio in at least one country. This leads to
Proposition 5 The wage-rental ratio will increase in both countries with trade under
different factor prices if each country hosts a significant range of industries, following
the sepacialization pattern, given by Propositions 2 and 3. If a country hosts only a too
small range of industries, then it may experience a decrease in the wage-rental ratio,
whereas the other country will definitely experience an increase.
A decrease in the wage-rental ratio implies that domestic income decreases, that is,
the country experiencing a decrease in the wage-rental ratio becomes less influential in
terms of its share in world income, which coincides with zˆ for North, and with (1− zˆ)
for South; see equation (7).9 If the wage-rental ratio increases in only one country, this
country will become a significantly dominant player in a larger (integrated) market
than before. An increase in the wage-rental ratio, however, implies also an increase
in production costs, and so does a change in commodity prices. Therefore, a thorough
analysis of potential rationalization effects is warranted to find out about welfare effects
of trade under different factor prices.
A country will benefit from rationalization effects if the number of firms in an industry
that it is hosting decreases, and/or if each firm’s size increases. Recall that in equi-
librium Home (North), the capital-abundant country, produces the capital-intensive
goods in the range [0, zˆ]; and Foreign (South), the labor-abundant country produces
the labor-intensive goods in the range [zˆ, 1]. Let us denote the trade situation and
autarky, respectively, by superscript t and a. In equilibrium, the number of firms in
industry z is thus denoted by nt(z) if industry z is hosted by Home (z ∈ [0, zˆ]), or
denoted by n∗t(z) if it is hosted by Foreign (z ∈ [zˆ, 1]) under trade. Similarly, in equi-
librium, denote by na(z) and n∗a(z), the number of firms in industry z that is hosted,
9We shall note that zˆ is determined endogenously by equation (6); it can be computed by substituting
equations (8), (9) and (10) back into equation (6), and by solving for zˆ, which will warrant a specific
κ-function that must be consistent with the ranking of industries; see Section 4 for one that is used
in simulating the model for a welfare analysis.
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respectively, by Home and Foreign under autarky. Given that the rental in each coun-
try serves as the numeraire in the autarky equilibrium, and r = 1 in the integrated
equilibrium, and that ζ(zˆ) ≡ ∫ zˆ0 √κ(z)dz < Ω ≡ ∫ 10 √κ(z)dz, we can show that
nt(z) =
√
Iw
κ(z) =
K
ζ(zˆ)
√
κ(z)
> na(z) =
√
I
κ(z) =
K
Ω
√
κ(z)
, for any z ∈ [0, zˆ];
n∗t(z) =
√
Iw
r∗κ(z) =
K∗
(Ω− ζ(zˆ))
√
κ(z)
(11)
> n∗a(z) =
√
I∗
κ(z) =
K∗
Ω
√
κ(z)
, for any z ∈ [zˆ, 1].
It is straightforward to show that, unlike partial equilibrium Cournot models in which
market entry is excessive, the socially optimal number of firms (K/
∫ 1
0 κ(z)dz in North,
or K∗/
∫ 1
0 κ(z)dz in South)10 is less than the autarky number of firms (na(z) in North,
or n∗a(z) in South) only for less capital-intensive industries, for which Ω
√
κ(z) <∫ 1
0 κ(z)dz, whereas it is more for more capital-intensive industries, for which Ω
√
κ(z) >∫ 1
0 κ(z)dz. We can conclude from equation (11) that
Proposition 6 The laissez-faire number of firms can be either below or above the
socially optimal number of firms, and free trade under different factor prices, leading
countries to specialize in production of a certain range of goods, exacerbates distortions
at the extensive margin (firm entry).
Using equation (11), we can show that the aggregate number of firms in industry z is
equal to na(z) + n∗a(z) = (K + K∗)/Ω
√
κ(z) under autarky, which is less than nt(z)
for all z ∈ [0, zˆ], or greater than n∗t(z) for all z ∈ [zˆ, 1] if
K
K∗
>
ζ(zˆ)
Ω− ζ(zˆ) . (12)
A sufficient condition for inequality (12) to hold is that North, the capital-abundant
country, and South, the labor-abundant country, are sufficiently asymmetric in terms
of their absolute capital endowments, leading us to
10Note that the output behavior follows profit maximization, and we consider only market entry as
in Mankiw and Whinston (1986). See Koska and Stähler (2014) for the derivation of the socially
optimal number of firms.
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Proposition 7 A beneficial rationalization effect of free trade under different factor
prices will be metarialized unambiguously in industries that are hosted by South if North
has a sufficiently larger capital endowment than South, whereas the rationalization effect
in industries that are hosted by North can only come about from changes in firm size.
Firm-level outputs in industry z in North and in South under autarky, which we will
denote, respectively, by yai (z) and y∗ai (z), are given by equation (2), where r = r∗ = 1,
I = K2/Ω2 and I∗ = K∗2/Ω2, in equilibrium, and the wage-rental ratios are given by
equation (5). Similar functions will hold for the trade situation, except that autarky
income in each country should be replaced by world income, given by equation (8), and
that factor prices are given by equations (9) and (10), and r = 1. Let yti(z) and y∗ti (z)
denote firm-level outputs in the trade situation. The change in firm size with trade in
industry z hosted by North or by South is, respectively, given by
yti(z)
yai (z)
= σ(z)
(
K − Ω2
Kzˆ − ζ(zˆ)2
)
ζ(zˆ)
Ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Υ(zˆ)
for any z ∈ [0, zˆ],
y∗ti (z)
y∗ai (z)
= σ∗(z)
(
K∗ − Ω2
K∗(1− zˆ)− (Ω− ζ(zˆ))2
)(
1− ζ(zˆ)Ω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Υ∗(zˆ)
for any z ∈ [zˆ, 1],
where σ(z) ≡
(
K − ζ(zˆ)
√
κ(z)
)
/
(
K − Ω
√
κ(z)
)
> 1 for all z because ζ(zˆ) < Ω, and
where σ∗(z) ≡ 1 +
(
ζ(zˆ)
√
κ(z)/
(
K∗ − Ω
√
κ(z)
))
> 1 for all z.
We now compare the change in firm size with trade in each country. Not surprisingly,
a decrease in the wage-rental ratio in a country (in North if zˆ < z, or in South if
zˆ > z; see Proposition 5) leads to an increase in firm size in all industries hosted
by this country (as Υ(zˆ ≤ z) ≥ Ω/ζ(zˆ) > 1 and Υ∗(zˆ ≥ z) ≥ Ω/(Ω − ζ(zˆ)) > 1):
production costs decrease with a decrease in the wage-rental ratio and firms face a
larger (integrated) market with trade liberalization. If, however, there is an increase
in the wage-rental ratio in a country, then each firm estblished in this country faces
a larger market, while facing an increase in production costs, which implies that an
increase in firm size may not be guaranteed for all industries in a country where the
wage-rental ratio increases.11 In particular, we can find threshold values of zˆ ∈ [z, z]
such that, depending on the equilibrium value of zˆ, yti(z)/yai (z) > 1 for all z ∈ [0, zˆ],
or y∗ti (z)/y∗ai (z) > 1 for all z ∈ [zˆ, 1]. Similarly, we can find threshold values of zˆ ∈
11In perfectly competitive models with a single production factor (labor) we would not see such labor
market effects.
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[z, z] such that, depending on the equilibrium value of zˆ and for threshold industry
z˜, yti(z˜)/yai (z˜) = 1, or y∗ti (z˜)/y∗ai (z˜) = 1, firm size increases in industries that are
more capital-intensive than the threshold industry (z < z˜), and it decreases in other
industries (z > z˜), because
∂σ(z)
∂z
= K(Ω− ζ(zˆ))κ
′(z)
2
√
κ(z)
(
K − Ω
√
κ(z)
)2 < 0; ∂σ∗(z)∂z = K
∗ζ(zˆ)κ′(z)
2
√
κ(z)
(
K∗ − Ω
√
κ(z)
)2 < 0,
since κ′(z) < 0. It is now clear that the effect of trade on firm size depends on the
industry’s capital intensity and on the range of products that each country specializes
in, which is mainly determined by each country’s factor endowments. To scrutinize the
welfare implications of trade under different factor prices between the trading partners,
we next look at the trade-induced changes in per-capita consumption and simulate the
model for different constellations of parameter values.
4 Welfare implications
Per-capita consumption of commodity z in North and in South under autarky, which
we will denote, respectively, by yˆai (z) ≡ Y a(z)/L and yˆ∗ai (z) ≡ Y ∗a(z)/L∗, can be
derived by substituting r = r∗ = 1, I = K2/Ω2 and I∗ = K∗2/Ω2, and the wage-
rental ratios, given by equation (5), into equation (2). Similar functions will hold for
the trade situation, except that autarky income in each country should be replaced by
world income, given by equation (8), and that factor prices are given by equations (9)
and (10), and r = 1. Let yˆti(z) ≡ Y t(z)/(L+L∗) and yˆ∗ti (z) ≡ Y ∗t(z)/(L+L∗) denote,
respectively, per-capita consumption of commodity z in North and in South in the
trade situation. The trade-induced changes in per-capita consumption of commodity z
can be expressed as
δ(z) ≡ yˆ
t
i(z)
yˆai (z)
= σ(z)
(
K − Ω2
Kzˆ − ζ(zˆ)2
)
, for any z ∈ [0, zˆ],
δ∗(z) ≡ yˆ
∗t
i (z)
yˆ∗ai (z)
= σ∗(z)
(
K∗ − Ω2
K∗(1− zˆ)− (Ω− ζ(zˆ))2
)
, for any z ∈ [zˆ, 1].
When the capital input requirements strictly decrease with z, the trade-induced changes
in per-capita consumption and welfare are ambiguous. Given our specification of utility,
trade unambiguously improves welfare in North and in South if, respectively,
v ≡
∫ zˆ
0
ln(δ(z))dz ≥ 0; v∗ ≡
∫ 1
zˆ
ln(δ∗(z))dz ≥ 0.
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As to analyze the welfare effects, we have simulated the model, assuming labor input
requirements are constant across industries, ∀ z ∈ [0, 1] , λ (z) = 1. Also we assign a
specific function to κ (z), that is, κ (z) = 2 − z.12 In this setup, trade would improve
welfare if factor prices could equalize as is shown by Koska and Stähler (2014).13 Table 1
summarizes the results of our simulation.
<Table 1 about here.>
Table 1 shows the factor endowments, the relative factor prices, income levels, the
(aggregate) number of firms serving each country, and the welfare change indices v and
v∗ for both countries. The number of firms is defined as the average number of firms
in all industries hosted by the respective country, that is,
na ≡
∫ 1
0
na(z)dz; n∗a ≡
∫ 1
0
n∗a(z)dz;
n ≡
∫ zˆ
0
nt(z)dz; n∗ ≡
∫ 1
zˆ
n∗t(z)dz.
In the first simulation (Sim#1), we look at the outcomes of autarky and trade integra-
tion when there is perfect symmetry across countries such that the two countries are
perfectly symmetric in their factor endowments: K = K∗ = L = L∗ = 30.
In case of perfect symmetry, in autarky, the two countries have identical relative fac-
tor prices, income levels, and number of firms, because not only their per-capita en-
dowments are the same, but also their absolute capital stocks and labor endowments
are identical. In case of trade integration under equal relative factor prices, autarky
per-capita endowments coincide with the one for the integrated economy such that
((K + K∗)/(L + L∗) = K/L = K∗/L∗ = 1), although the size of the capital stock
in the integrated economy is twice as big as each country’s capital stock in autarky,
which leads to an increase in the wage-rental ratio and in world income. As the (world)
aggregate income - when relative factor prices are equalized - is four times as big as
each country’s autarky income (each country has doubled its autarky income with
12Assigning such a specific function to κ(z) is merely a technical simplification. Any functional form
that is consistent with the model’s setup (e.g., the ranking of industries and differentiability of κ)
and that assigns a well-defined value to κ(z) for any z ∈ [0, 1] would generate qualitatively similar
simulation results.
13The reason is that κ′′ = 0 guarantees positive gains from trade in the case of factor price equalization.
Nevertheless, we simulate also the case of perfectly symmetric countries, leading to factor price
equalization, and include the results in Table 1.
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trade integration), the aggregate number of firms serving both markets (n + n∗) is
now twice as big as the aggregate number of firms serving each market in autarky
(na = n∗a). Although the number of firms located in each country is ambiguous, it is
straightforward to show that firm-level output for capital-intensively produced goods
and per-capita consumption in these goods increase, whereas firm-level output and
per-capita consumption for all other goods decrease.
Our simulation results confirm that, given λ and κ, where κ′′ = 0, each country’s welfare
(and overall welfare) improves when the two countries that are perfectly symmetric in
their factor endowments engage in free trade. The intuition is as follows. The aggregate
number of firms in the FPE equilibrium is equal to the sum of each country’s aggregate
autarky number of firms, although the integrated market is larger and carries more firms
as compared to each country’s market under autarky: (n+ n∗) > na = n∗a. Moreover,
trade integration increases production costs relative to establishment costs as the FPE
wage-rental ratio is almost twice as high as each country’s autarky wage-rental ratio.
This has an implication for autarky distortions such that firm-level output increases in
industries where firm entry in autarky was too moderate, and it decreases in industries
where firm entry in autarky was too excessive. Similarly, per-capita consumption in
industries where firm entry in autarky was too moderate increases. Finally, we shall
recall that any distortion in this simulation is symmetric across countries.
In all other simulations (Sim#2 − 11), we scrutinize the outcomes of the NFPE case,
simply by looking at the two countries that are sufficiently asymmetric in their fac-
tor endowments such that there exists an NFPE equilibrium. We shall note that, in
Sim#2− 11, the factor endowments are outside the FPE set.14 The simulations differ
such that we increase the capital stock of the capital-abundant, domestic country by
10. We see that this increase in the domestic capital stock increases the wage-rental
ratio in the domestic country both in autarky and under free trade. However, the in-
crease under free trade is much larger. At the same time, it is straightforward to show
that the increases in the wage-rental ratios from autarky to trade for both countries,
that is, w/wa and (w∗/r∗)/w∗a, do not change much across these simulations. This has
the implication that zˆ is roughly equal to 0.5 across all simulations and decreases only
marginally with an increase in K.
Both countries gain from trade in the first three simulations (Sim#2 − 4), but once
K = 60 is reached, it is only the foreign country that gains, and these gains increase
14The computations of all simulations are available upon request.
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when the domestic capital stock is increased further. For the domestic country, the
gains from trade become smaller over the whole range and turn negative after Sim#4
which shows that trade may reduce welfare and proves
Proposition 8 In the case that trade does not equalize factor prices, trade may reduce
a country’s welfare even if parameters are such that the welfare effects were unambigu-
ously positive in an equilibrium in which relative factor prices had been equalized.
Proposition 8 is interesting because it is in contrast to the common view that special-
ization is the key for gains from trade. Why does trade make the domestic country
even suffer if it does not equalize factor prices at the same time? The increase in the
wage-rental ratio has ambiguous effects: on the one hand, it becomes relatively less ex-
pensive to establish a firm, and this reduces entry distortions for the industries hosted
by the domestic country; on the other hand, it becomes more expensive to run a firm
which leads to a reduction in firm size. The last effect will be pronounced when the
capital stock is relatively large compared to the foreign country.
Since the changes in the wage-rental ratio and zˆ are not strong, the key for understand-
ing the asymmetric welfare effect is the comparison of the average numbers of firms
before and after trade. Due to a nearly unchanged zˆ, the average number of firms in
the foreign country goes up from 13 to 16 from autarky to trade in all simulations. In
autarky, however, the foreign country had to host all industries, and thus it is clear that
less than 13 were active on average in the range z ∈ [0, 0.5]. Furthermore, this country
now exploits its comparative advantage and establishes firms only in labor-intensive
industries under free trade. Thus, the average number of firms in the range z ∈ [0.5, 1]
must have been less than 16 under autarky as it also had to host capital-intensive in-
dustries under autarky. Hence, this country experiences a strong welfare gain because
many more domestic firms serve the range z ∈ [0, 0.5] under free trade.
The (large) domestic country, however, faces a trade-off. On the one hand, it specializes
in the range z ∈ [0, 0.5] which is clearly a welfare gain. In this range, more firms are
active on average because the range z ∈ [0.5, 1] will not be hosted anymore under
free trade. On the other hand, it now imports commodities in this range from the
(small) foreign country which establishes on average 16 firms in these industries. If
K = 30 (Sim#2), na = 20.38 and since z ∈ [0.5, 1] does not require much investment,
more than 20 firms have been active in these industries under autarky. Thus, trade
increases the domestic markup for these commodities, leading to a domestic welfare
loss. For a sufficiently small asymmetry, however, the specialization gain dominates this
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welfare loss. But with an increase in K, the overall welfare effect becomes negative. For
example, if K = 120 (Sim#11), more than 81 firms have been active on average in the
range z ∈ [0.5, 1] under autarky which are replaced by only 16 foreign firms under free
trade, leading to a substantial decrease in domestic consumption of labor-intensively
produced goods. In this sense, the foreign country is too small for the domestic country.
Note carefully that the small change of zˆ with K implied by our simulation is favorable
for domestic welfare gains in case of substantial asymmetries. If zˆ dropped substantially,
specialization gains would affect a smaller range of industries and the (small) foreign
country would have to host even more industries. Last but not least, the overall (net)
change in (world) welfare seems to be positive such that the positive change in the
foreign country’s welfare in our simulations is always larger than the negative change
in the domestic country’s welfare. Therefore we may argue that the foreign firm could
theoretically compensate the domestic firm so that both countries gain from trade.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the implications of different factor prices on the patterns of
and gains from trade in a multi-industry general equilibrium model of oligopolistic
competition and free market entry in which all industries are subject to increasing
returns to scale. As in Koska and Stähler (2014), building on the famous Dornbusch-
Fischer-Samuelson (DFS) model and focusing only on the equilibrium with factor price
equalization, differences in both absolute and relative factor endowments give rise to
trade in our model. The difference is that we have focused on inter-industry trade.
We have considered two countries that are sufficiently asymmetric in terms of factor
endowments, two factors of production that play different roles, and free market entry
and exit that depends on both absolute and relative factor endowments. Hence, also
the capital market is endogenous. We have shown that the general equilibrium effects
of factor price changes play a crucial role for the welfare effects of trade.
In particular, we have shown that there is no coexistence of domestic and foreign
firms in the same industry if factor prices are different between the countries, and that
oligopolistic competition does not reverse the specialization patterns as they are well
known from classical trade models. Unless one country specializes in production of
a sufficiently small range of goods, the wage-rental ratio increases in both countries.
While markets become larger due to trade integration, also production costs increase.
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If the countries are sufficiently asymmetric in terms of their capital endowments, then
a beneficial rationalization effect of free trade under different factor prices will be ma-
terialized unambiguously only in industries that are hosted by South, whereas the
trade-induced changes in firm size and/or per-capita consumption are ambiguous. In
an equilibrium in which factor prices do not equalize, the general equilibrium effects
may make a country worse off. This is especially the case when countries are sufficiently
asymmetric in their factor endowments such that the capital stock of one country is
sufficiently large compared to that of the other country. In such a situation, when the
two countries engage in free trade, the wage-rental ratio in the capital-abundant coun-
try substantially increases, with which establishing a firm becomes relatively cheap,
reducing entry distortions for the capital-abundant country hosting capital-intensive
industries. However, a small country may not be able to host a sufficiently large number
of firms in labor-intensive industries, despite the specialization gains. Provided there is
sufficient asymmetry in relative factor endowments, this effect is not overcompensated
by the capital-abundant country’s gains from specialization.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In an integrated market: Y (z) = ∑i yi(z) +∑i y∗i (z). The first-order conditions are
∂Πi(z)
∂yi(z)
= p(z)− λ(z)w + pY (z)(z)yi(z)
= I
w
Y (z) − λ(z)w −
Iwyi (z)
Y (z)2 = 0,
∂Π∗i (z)
∂y∗i (z)
= p(z)− λ(z)w∗ + pY (z)(z)y∗i (z)
= I
w
Y (z) − λ(z)w
∗ − I
wy∗i (z)
Y (z)2 = 0.
All firms within industry z are symmetric such that Y (z) = n(z)yi(z) + n∗(z)y∗i (z).
Using symmetry, we find that
yi(z) =
Iw(n(z) + n∗(z)− 1)(n∗(z)w∗ − (n∗(z)− 1)w)
λ(z)(n(z)w + n∗(z)w∗)2 ,
y∗i (z) =
Iw(n(z) + n∗(z)− 1)(n(z)w − (n(z)− 1)w∗)
λ(z)(n(z)w + n∗(z)w∗)2 ,
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leading to maximized profits
Πi(z) =
Iw(n∗(z)w∗ − (n∗(z)− 1)w)2
(n(z)w + n∗(z)w∗)2 − rκ(z) = 0,
Π∗i (z) =
Iw(n(z)w − (n(z)− 1)w∗)2
(n(z)w + n∗(z)w∗)2 − r
∗κ(z) = 0,
which are equal to zero in equilibrium. Coexistence requires that both equations are
independent. However, differentiation of maximized profits w.r.t. n(z) and n∗(z) leads
to
|J | = ∂Πi(z)
∂n(z)
∂Π∗i (z)
∂n∗(z) −
∂Πi(z)
∂n∗(z)
∂Π∗i (z)
∂n(z) = 0,
which shows that the Jacobian is zero and proves that coexistence is impossible for
different factor prices.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Define the following functions
θ(z) = w
1−
√
r∗κ(z)
Iw
 , φ(z) = w∗
1−
√
κ(z)
Iw
 .
Using the domestic rental as a numeraire, that is r = 1, at zˆ : θ(zˆ) = φ(zˆ). Differenti-
ation yields
θ′(z) = −w2
√
r∗
Iwκ(z)κ
′ (z) > 0, φ′(z) = −w
∗
2
√
1
Iwκ(z)κ
′ (z) > 0.
At any intersection of θ(z) and φ(z) in the θ/φ − z–space, either θ′(z) ≥ φ′(z) or
θ′(z) < φ′(z). If θ′(z) ≥ φ′(z), prices are (weakly) lower for all z < (>)zˆ in the domestic
(foreign) country and it must be that
√
r∗w ≥ w∗. On the contrary, if θ′(z) < φ′(z),
prices are lower for all z < (>)zˆ in the foreign (domestic) country and it must be
that
√
r∗w < w∗. Hence, there can be only one zˆ as two intersections would warrant√
r∗w ≥ w∗ and √r∗w < w∗ at the same time.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
A direct implication of Proposition 2 is that a certain vector of factor prices implies a
unique zˆ. Suppose that zˆ is given. Differentiating the equilibrium conditions
wL+K − zˆIw = 0,
K −
√
Iw
∫ zˆ
0
√
κ(z)dz = 0,
K∗ −
√
Iw
r∗
∫ 1
zˆ
√
κ(z)dz = 0,
Iw − wL−K − w∗L∗ − r∗K∗ = 0
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yields 
L 0 0 zˆ
0 0 0 ξ24
0 0 ξ33 ξ34
−L −L∗ −K∗ 1


dw
dw∗
dr∗
dIw
 = 0, (A.1)
where
ξ24 = −12
√
1
Iw
∫ zˆ
0
√
κ(z)dz < 0
ξ33 =
1
2r∗
√
Iw
r∗
∫ 1
zˆ
√
κ(z)dz > 0
ξ34 = −12
√
1
Iwr∗
∫ 1
zˆ
√
κ(z)dz < 0.
The Jacobian determinant of the matrix in (A.1) is equal to ξ24ξ33LL∗ and is thus
unambiguously negative. The unambiguous sign implies that there is one and only one
vector of factor prices for a given zˆ and, due to Proposition 2, one and only one zˆ for
any vector of factor prices, and the equilibrium is unique.
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